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ABSTRACT: What is more foreign to us than our own unconscious, showing us a 
limit to what can be seen and said? The author shows that not only is the foreign 
inscribed in the gaze, a gaze that cannot be reduced to the visible, but that it lies 
at the very heart of the human subject. Its irruption at various occasions, 
including when travelling between different countries, confronts us with what 
divides us and remains an enigma. This challenging experience mobilises our 
subjectivity, calling for a unique solution. Far from always being a sign of 
pathology, it can lead to inventive action, as shown by artistic and rite-of-
passage experiences. The author’s approach relies on what is transmitted to us 
by psychoanalysis, primarily highlighting the work of Freud. 
Keywords: foreign; the gaze,; the unconscious; depersonalisation; 
inventiveness; rite of passage. 
 
Resumo: O olhar e a prova do estrangeiro. O que poderia causar um sentimento 
de estranheza maior, ao ser humano, do que seu inconsciente que lhe mostra 
os limites de sua capacidade de ver e dizer? Esse artigo procura demonstrar que 
o estrangeiro não está apenas inscrito no olhar, um olhar que não se restringe 
ao visível, mas que se encontra no âmago do sujeito. Sua irrupção, a cada evento 
ocasional, inclusive ao mudar de país, confronta o sujeito com o que o divide e 
se torna um enigma para ele. Esse enigma representa uma verdadeira prova que 
mobiliza a subjetividade do indivíduo e a necessidade de um recurso singular 
para lidar com ele. Essa prova não revela necessariamente uma psicopatologia. 
Ela pode dar origem à inventividade, como mostram as experiências artísticas e 
iniciáticas. Para embasar a sua abordagem, a autora toma, como ponto de apoio 
e como horizonte, os conhecimentos da psicanálise, principalmente a 
contribuição freudiana. 
Palavras-chave: estrangeiro; olhar; inconsciente; despersonalização; 
inventividade; experiência iniciática. 
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he clinic of exile shows us that when trying to describe the difficult experience of confronting the unknown 
and its transformations, most individuals spontaneously speak about “the gaze”. Their words suggest that 
it is precisely the gaze that registers the weakening of the points of reference, of the framework that usually 
enables each individual to recognize himself and be recognized as a member of the human community. I would 
like to show that not only is this foreignness, revived at this precise moment, located in the gaze of others, a 
gaze that cannot be reduced to the visible, but that it is also at the very heart of the subject. Its emergence 
mobilises the subjectivity of each individual and the need to find singular solutions to the confrontation with 
this difficult challenge. This experience is not necessarily a sign of pathology and can in fact lead to highly 
inventive solutions, as shown by many artistic and initiatory experiences. To make my argument, I will build 
on the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis, but also on Graziella Magherini’s work on the power of artistic 
images.  
 
THE FREUDIAN CONTRIBUTION 
It is precisely its relationship to the foreign [l’étranger], that gives the gaze its paradigmatic status in 
analytic theory, showing the full significance of the Freudian theorisation of the drive, which, as the 
mainspring of desire, remains at the foundation of all subjectivity and perception. 
Freud’s revolutionary discovery was to show that the foreign concerns all human subjects due to the fact 
of their psychic division. This foreign dimension inhabits us all yet, at the same time, remains outside our 
control. Throughout his life’s work, Freud tried to bring this foreignness, one that has an impact on the gaze 
beyond the veil of the image, into focus: whether it was in the gaze of Medusa, in Oedipus blinding himself 
for having seen something he had always known, or in hysterical blindness. However, it was above all his own 
experience of the foreign that allowed him to elaborate his theory and open a new clinical perspective, one 
that goes beyond the omnipotence of the visible. It is worth remembering two crucial events that marked 
Freud’s own journey: 
• First, his fascination with Michelangelo’s Moses, a work of art he thought expressed “the angry scorn of 
the hero's glance” (FREUD, 1914, p. 212), reproaching the artist for having betrayed the First 
Commandment. He was intrigued by the spectator’s paralysis before the image of the man who 
formulated the prohibition of all representation, and he made this enigma the very object of his study. 
Together with Oedipus, Moses became a key mythical figure, occupying a central place in Freud’s theory. 
It was Moses whom Freud chose for the final chapter of his work, an oeuvre that restores to the father 
his alien nature and demands its reader to understand the visible based on the invisible it both contains 
and is transcended by. What Freud tells us in Moses and Monotheism (1939) is that the origin of a people 
is always sustained by the foreign, and this foreign influence, in terms of both the people’s sense of 
belonging and future destiny, is then deployed from one monotheism to another. 
By showing us that the father was always Other and that the symbolic murder was a fact of language, 
Freud distanced himself from the deadly traps of “total vision”, of omniscience and omnipotence. He 
pointed out that all acts of naming were necessarily inhabited by the unspeakable, which humans have 
always tried to subvert: not without causing havoc and chaos, and always using the means of their day 
and age.  
• Second, we remember Freud’s troubling experience in Athens in 1904. When he unexpectedly found 
himself standing with his younger brother Alexander on the Acropolis, he was suddenly seized by a doubt 
as to what he was seeing: “By the evidence of my senses I am now standing on the Acropolis, but I cannot 
believe it […] ‘What I see here is not real’” (FREUD, 1936, p. 223-226). Before the temple in Athens, Freud’s 
vision became blurred. It was not just a fausse reconnaissance: he discovered what he had seen, as a 
child, in the pictures of the Acropolis, but also realised that he had refused to believe in this reality, which 
seemed so inaccessible. Later, he interprets this moment of derealisation, closely resembling 
depersonalisation, by relating it to a fundamental human “psychotic trait”, which calls to mind what Lacan 
T 
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articulates as the other type of “foreclosure of sens” (LACAN, 1975-1976, p. 320). Because of this 
characteristic shared by neuroses, psychoses and perversions, “derealizations and depersonalizations are 
intimately connected” (FREUD, 1936, p. 227). He writes that these feelings of strangeness “arise very 
frequently in certain mental diseases, but they are not unknown among normal people, just as 
hallucinations occasionally occur in the healthy” (idem). What they all have in common is that they are 
defense mechanisms, trying to “keep something out of us” (idem). However, he explains, the new 
elements that can trigger a defense reaction “approach the ego from two directions—from the real 
external world and from the internal world of thoughts and impulses that emerge in the ego. It is possible 
that this alternative coincides with the choice between derealizations proper and de-personalizations” 
(idem). 
 
STENDHAL SYNDROME 
This feeling of strangeness1 cannot but remind us of what the Italian psychiatrist Graziella Magherini has 
called “Stendhal syndrome” (1990), referring to a curious episode experienced by the French writer and 
described in his book Rome, Naples and Florence (1987). While visiting the Basilica of Santa-Croce for the first 
time, Stendhal suddenly felt strong anxiety while contemplating Volterrano’s frescoes. He was only able to 
calm down by reading Foscolo’s poem Sepulchres, which was inspired by the Basilica, the burial site of some 
of the most illustrious Italians. According to Magherini and as reported by A. and G. Haddad (1995, p. 84), 
many of the travellers visiting Florence have experienced a malaise similar to Stendhal’s. “Their mood sinks, 
they become depressed and sometimes have a strong feeling of their limits becoming blurred, a feeling of 
fragmentation and a sense of leaving their body.” This temporary disturbance, linked to the emotional impact 
of the work of art, the “power of the image”, is subject to cultural differences. For example, an Italian who 
has lived all his whole life surrounded by religious images would be less affected by them than travellers from 
other backgrounds. Likewise, an American, whose gaze is supposedly framed by other mythological 
references, experiences this “image shock” much less intensely than a European. The expressions of this 
disturbance or emotional reaction vary across cultures, but also depend on the ways in which individuals 
uniquely participate in them and can take on different and less spectacular forms (such as speechlessness). 
Magherini writes that Stendhal syndrome can trigger a mental confusion, which in some cases turns into 
a hallucinatory episode. Nevertheless, we cannot put such cases and the experience of derealisation, which is 
not necessarily pathological, into the same category. The disturbance described by Magherini can manifest in 
any individual confronted with the experience of exile or with a new element that disrupts his or her routines 
and changes the way he or she sees the world.  
This irruption of the foreign, which is none other than the unconscious and can only be experienced, 
disconnects words from things, the signifier from the signified. It abolishes the categories of time (the 
unconscious knows nothing about chronological time) and familiar perceptions, making space for a strangely 
intimate feeling of not having a unified self, leading to a state of confusion. What is stranger to a human being 
than his unconscious, showing him the limits of what can be seen and said?  
This foreign dimension concerns all human subjects, regardless of their psychotic or neurotic structure. 
However, in psychosis, what would otherwise be repressed is instead encountered in the real, via 
hallucinations or as a delusion. 
In neurosis, the return of the repressed leads to the formations of the unconscious, showing us that what 
is most intimate to us can simultaneously appear as the most alien. Freud shows that the emergence of the 
unconscious in dreams, slips of the tongue and witticisms but also in certain encounters and works of art, are 
                                                         
1 [Translator’s note: The author uses the expression sentiment d’étrangeté, the habitual French translation of Freud’s 
Entfremdungsgefühl, which the Standard Edition renders as “derealisation”, for example in A Disturbance of Memory on 
the Acropolis. Where appropriate and in keeping with the author’s larger argument, I have also used a literal translation 
to maintain the resonance with l’étranger as the foreign, as radical otherness. 
RAJAA STITOU  
Ágora (Rio de Janeiro) v. XXII  n. 1  jan/abr    2019  1- 7     4 
presented to us as riddles to be deciphered, making us wonder, after the fact: What has just happened? What 
does it mean? or think No, this cannot be me. 
Freud often said that in regard to this enigmatic other place, artists tend to be the avant-garde. This other 
place, which influences all creators, is inherent to any representation; however, it also constitutes its 
“beyond”, because all creative works also transmit something unspeakable, something that needs a form to 
make itself be seen. This unspeakable is conveyed, for example, by the rhythm of a song or the lines of a poem. 
In this sense, the creative process resembles dream-work. 
 
THE ORDEAL OF THE FOREIGN AND INVENTIVENESS 
According to Freud, both dreams and works of art are “the imaginary satisfactions of unconscious wishes” 
(FREUD, 1925, p. 112) and subject to the same processes. The dream initially consists of visual, sonorous and 
tactile images, which are then related through speech and interpreted. It is by virtue of emerging from oblivion 
that the memory of a dream can be interpreted. 
If the dreamer, the subject of this unconscious desire, is located on the side of the signifier, i.e., following 
the logic of lack rather than logic of meaning, what can we say about the artist’s relationship to the 
unspeakable?  
He or she translates it into a unique aesthetic form, metaphorises it via an image, in the sense that Plato 
defines it in Timaeus: “Since even the conditions of an image’s occurrence lie outside the image itself – since 
it is an ever-moving apparition of something else – it has to occur in something other than itself (and so 
somehow or other to cling to existence), or it would be nothing at all” (PLATO, 1970, 52c3-5). The work of art 
transmits an enigma that testifies to the “relation with the unknown” (ROSOLATO, 1978), yet imposes on it 
the limits of a particular form, using a language that, while possibly shared with others, does not foreclose 
this enigmatic dimension. In this way, it can leave the chaos of formlessness from which it has emerged, and 
a work of mourning begins, eventually allowing the author to consent to a loss. This opens up the possibility 
of sublimation, which is not an end in itself, but, in a movement from loss to discovery, rekindles desire, 
pointing it towards new horizons. 
This movement from formlessness to the shaping of the work is always unique. It has been described by 
certain authors as the difficult ordeal of the foreign, a path of initiation that transmutes the relationship to 
the unknown, trans-forming it into a relation of inventiveness. It is worth listening to each author speak about 
this process him or herself; however, I will only focus on a few key points.  
For Michel de M’Uzan, the creative work carries a trace of the psychic state that presided at its birth. He 
describes the creative pathway as a kind of moulting, a genuine metamorphosis, a dramatic rather than idyllic 
experience (DE M’UZAN, 1977, p. 4). Its struggle stems from the fact that it is not just the life drives that are 
at work in it, but also the death drive. M’Uzan distinguishes between: 
A moment of “shock” [saisissement] (ibidem, p. 6), which he describes as traumatic. This is an initial moment 
of inspiration, in which the real emerges, disrupting the subject’s “economic peace” and threatening his 
identity. This involves new demands coming from the drives and requires a change in the subject’s position 
towards himself and the world. There is a feeling of strangeness and a “blurring of boundaries”. 
The second moment, which is of vital importance and appears as a pressing need, corresponds to a movement 
“from discontinuity to continuity” (ibidem, p. 8). This period stages the scene of the subject’s “confrontation” 
with the mass of excitation threatening to overwhelm him or her. The beginning of a new arrangement creates 
new possibilities by elaborating the traumatic experience and translating it into forms and images.  
The third moment is the return “to a new reality of a radical metamorphosis, which still betrays the chaos and 
violent conflicts over which order has been established” (ibidem, p. 10). We should nevertheless keep in mind 
that although M’Uzan describes the creative process as following a certain logic of meaning, it should by no 
means be seen as linear or as leading from a beginning to an end. Grasping its beginning can only be a kind of 
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illusion. What it shows us is nothing other than the ordeal of the foreign, in other words, the experience of a 
new loss, based on which something beyond the known will occur by means of an oeuvre, via a nomination. 
Anton Ehrenzweig speaks about the creative process as a temporary madness that transcends the limits 
of rational thought. He uses the term unconscious “scanning”, alluding to not only subjective dispersion and 
chaos, but also the idea of scansion (EHRENZWEIG, 1971, p. 9). To him, the creative process also consists of 
three stages: 
The “schizoid” and persecutory stage, where we see the emergence of chaos and a partial fragmentation of 
the ego, the parts of which are then projected into the work. 
The “dedifferentiation” stage (ibidem, p. 33) or “unconscious scanning”, which, akin to romantic passion or 
mystical ecstasy, destabilises the limits between the subject and the world, stripping objects of their concrete 
materiality. During this stage, Ehrenzweig also speaks about a “manic ocean limit”, referring to the wave of 
excitation that sweeps over the artist, while deep down the creative process is already at work.  
The moment of the return to oneself: consciousness returns and something new has emerged from the chaos. 
However, this return to reality triggers a depression, which requires strength to resist the “almost anal disgust 
that would make us sweep the whole mess into the waste-paper basket” (ibidem, p. 103). The anxiety of 
persecution is superseded by the anxiety of loss and a sense of failure, because the object can never be grasped 
fully.  
Finally, Catherine Clement (1990), taking up Ehrenzweig’s analysis, speaks about a “syncope”, a 
dissolution of the subject, to describe this confrontation with the foreign as a precondition for the production 
of an oeuvre. This “syncopated and fertile moment” is also marked by an “unspeakable enjoyment”, which 
provokes the fading of the subject and leaves behind a remainder: the work of art that marks a cut, the objet 
a of Lacan’s formula, the “object-cause of desire”, always missed and impossible to name.  
These different approaches demonstrate that each creative experience contains, at its core, a dimension 
of the unknown, whose emergence profoundly challenges the subject and whose intensity corroborates the 
link Freud makes between the derealisation and depersonalisation. If this confrontation is to be effective or 
creative, it has to be mediated through language via a form, image or a name, albeit without being reducible 
to either of these elements. Hence the possibility of reinvention, of perpetual reconstruction, each time 
creating a new opportunity of a crossing over, a moulting or a renaissance, opening our gaze to what lies 
beyond the visible and welcoming the world that has been made anew. 
In this way, the foreign, the unspeakable, is given a form in a work  this movement reminds us of initiation 
rites, which are, as I would now like to show, highly instructive. 
 
THE EXPERIENCE OF INITIATION 
The creative experience is in fact very close to initiation in the cycle of mutations and metamorphoses. 
Initiation is both an opening and a defence against the ungraspable dimension of the human subject, both 
within and outside us. It is concerned with what has been celebrated by naming, images and symbols since 
humans invented language. It creates and renews the social link. 
For Eliade, all initiation rites include a ritual death, followed by a resurrection or a rebirth (ELIADE, 1959, 
p. 144). This moment of transformation makes it possible to bring the past onto the scene of the future. 
The ritual death, often symbolised by the shadows or a cosmic night, has to do with the chaos, an 
exemplary expression of “the paradoxical point of passage from one mode of being to another” (ibidem, p. 
26). 
Yet all creation is a kind of regeneration, Eliade writes. The regeneration described by him is often 
compared to a mystical experience. The great Sufi mystic Ibn Arabi (1994) speaks about this symbolic rebirth 
as a contemplative journey, reflecting on oneself and the world, the existence of which depends on perpetual 
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transformation. He distinguishes between the horizontal dimension of this journey, which concerns its spatial 
geography, and the vertical dimension as a movement from the outside towards the inside and beyond, 
towards transcendence, towards the unknown. This verticality, the very foundation of the movement of 
existence, is a form of renewal.  
In his view, the voyage (Safar, asfar), the Arabic root of which contains the notion of unveiling (isfar), can 
bear spiritual fruit (natya, natay), evoking the idea of childbirth.  
The unveiling gives the traveller access to “the most mysterious secrets, as its light dispels all illusions”; 
it suggests a movement from the inaccessible aspects of the divine (symbolised by ama or blindness) to the 
manifestation of attribution conceivable by created beings (1994). 
“God can be grasped by neither intellect nor speculation” (ibidem, p. 75). Because of human weakness, 
this voyage, which Ibn Arabi describes as perplexity (hayra) or bedazzlement, is not without its dangers: 
“However, whoever sets off on this journey is immediately seized with natural worry, a tightness of chest and 
with fear, because from the very beginning of his path he can see his weakness approaching. But this weakness 
gives him dignity and force” (ibidem, p. 76). What the traveller discovers is that this indefinitely approachable 
Other is both attractive and terrifying, manifesting right where it escapes us, already vanishing as it appears. 
This movement of presence/absence, of veiling/unveiling, should not be understood, the author writes, 
via the dualist logic of thesis/antithesis or negation/affirmation. It can only evoke the subject ’s division, a 
division that cannot be reduced to any discursive contradiction. 
Ibn Arabi’s journey is also a voyage of the gaze. Yet it is equally a voyage of the breath, of movement, 
sounds, of the voice which, while being subject to the laws of language, constantly transmits, in myriad 
different forms, something beyond what can be perceived. Because the unknown permeates all human 
constructions, the traveller cannot become affixed to any one of them. He becomes the container of all forms, 
because the naming possibilities of language are infinite. In language, like in the unconscious, we are always 
already displaced, always far away from home. 
This is also revealed by the aesthetic vertigo of the creative act. Contrary to common discourse, which 
tries to conceal any perception of what cannot be understood, the creative act invites us to go precisely where 
meaning comes undone. It alludes to the unthinkable: Look at what you cannot see. Listen to what has no 
meaning. Speak about what you cannot say.  
Isn’t this unthinkable also carried by each unconscious gesture and perception, which the logic of 
meaning seeks to conceal? 
However, the logical discourse should not be confounded with signifiance, which highlights what is 
constantly stealing away and escapes all codification. Linked to the founding lack of being, this continuous 
seeping away of meaning is sustained by what Freud calls the primary process – a process of displacement 
and condensation, of perceptions and sensations  which continues to mark its presence throughout our lives, 
day and night, in each of our dreams. 
The creative act, which requires us to “let go”, is a response of what escapes us. It is the guarantor of the 
unknown. There can be no creative act without a cut, which means that nothing will be as it was. This act 
restores to language its enigmatic nature, welcoming it with open arms.  
Should this dimension, which artists are so good at relating, not be given more attention in an age 
dominated by the cult of the visible? Not as a kind of standardised interpretative framework, but as a new 
theorisation of the unthinkable, the non-representable, that which cannot be perceived but instead marks 
each perception, regardless of its kind: visual, auditory, olfactory, cutaneous, motoric, etc. 
This detour through the questions of creativity and the initiatory experience has shown us that the way 
in which subjects or collectives manage their relationship to the foreign testifies to the strength of their 
constructive and creative abilities. It can therefore have a pacifying influence, stirring us towards 
inventiveness.  
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However, what about the effects of fear or anxiety that can bring ruin or even disaster? In this case, the 
foreign is no longer recognized as part of oneself or as a vehicle of openness. Instead, it is projected outside 
or perceived as a threat to be dealt with. This refusal has nefarious effects on both the subject and the social 
link, as evidenced by everyday clinical experience with individuals who perceive the enigma within themselves 
as a handicap, one that they sometimes try to displace onto others not like them, in a furious effort to draw a 
line between the inside and the outside, to fetishize difference (STITOU, 2012). In my experience, their 
suffering often manifests as an inhibition, an inability to construct or create. This subjective position is at times 
fuelled by the social gaze, which sees the foreign as a danger rather than a potential asset.  
This foreignness, constantly veiled and unveiled, remembered and repeated in new contexts, with each 
new hardship, constitutes the rebellious aspect of each human subject. However, it also refers to the obscure 
point of any civilisation that humans struggle to understand or reject, and which is at the origin of our 
suffering, our creativity and also our ruin.  
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